A defendant who admits to having committed an o¤ ense may nevertheless be acquitted if he can provide a legally cognizable justi…cation or excuse for his actions by raising an a¢ rmative defense. This article explains how a¢ rmative defenses generate social bene…ts in the form of avoided unnecessary punishment. It then asks what kind of evidentiary standards must be used in order to balance these bene…ts against potential social costs arising from frivolous defense claims. It thereby provides an economic rationale for the uniformity across US jurisdictions in allocating the burden on the prosecution to prove the commission of the o¤ ense, as well as the variation across states in the standards of proof they use in determining the validity of a¢ rmative defenses. The analysis also explains why mere assertions of undeterrability should not be considered as a¢ rmative defenses.
Introduction
In the United States, in order to secure a conviction, the prosecution must prove all elements of the o¤ense. However, even if the prosecutor succeeds in doing this, the defendant may still avoid conviction if he can successfully raise an a¢ rmative defense. These defenses are distinct from what are sometimes called failure of proof defenses or negating defenses, which consist of demonstrating that one of the elements of the o¤ense has not been legally proven by the prosecution. A¢ rmative defenses, instead, typically protect a defendant who admits to having committed the o¤ense, but claims that his acts were either justi…able or excusable. Common a¢ rmative defenses include self-defense, defense of property, defense of others, necessity, duress, entrapment, insanity and intoxication.
There is no variation, or room for variation, across states as to what burden the prosecutor must meet in order to legally prove that the defendant committed the o¤ense. In 1970, In Re Winship unequivocally stated that the prosecution must prove all elements of an o¤ense beyond a reasonable doubt. Interestingly, because the lack of an a¢ rmative defense is not interpreted as being an element of the o¤ense, states have some freedom in specifying the burden necessary to prove or disprove an a¢ rmative defense. 1 This asymmetry has led to variation across states in what they consider to be a¢ rmative defenses. 2 Perhaps more importantly, state laws also di¤er with respect to who carries what kind of burden of proof on issues relating to a¢ rmative defenses. Thus, one state may require the prosecution to disprove an a¢ rmative defense raised by the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt, while another state may require the defendant to prove the defense by preponderance of the evidence, while yet another state may allocate the burden on the defendant and require clear and convincing evidence. 3 Despite these variations, there is a commonality across states: an a¢ rmative defense becomes an issue only if it is raised by the defendant who must provide some evidence to support it. Otherwise, it would be impracticable to allocate the burden of proof on the prosecution, since that would imply that the prosecutor must prove the absence of all possible a¢ rmative defenses.
The presence of such large variation across states suggests the lack of a form of conventional wisdom, or common rationale, that explains the reasons for preferring one legal design over another. Interestingly, there exists, to the best of my knowledge, no economic analysis of burdens of proof in a context that involves issues related to both o¤enses and defenses. 4 This stands in sharp contrast to the sizeable economics literature analyzing the e¤ects of various burden allocations in determining whether the actor has committed the harmful act. 5 A focal point of a strand in this literature is to explain the economic rationale behind having higher standards of proof in criminal trials than in civil trials. The issue of a¢ rmative defenses, however, has not been analyzed as of yet.
In this article, I present an economic analysis of a very large class of a¢ rmative defenses, namely those which are meant to protect acts that are either justi…ed or are excusable. An act is justi…able if it enhances welfare. Thus, in the frequently studied hypothetical where a person breaks into a cabin to survive through a blizzard, the actor has a necessity defense based on a justi…-cation. Other a¢ rmative defenses that are typically based on justi…cations are self-defense, defense of others, and defense of property. An act is excusable, if it is committed under circumstances where the actor could not be expected to react to legal incentives. 6 Insanity, duress, involuntary intoxication, and other diminished responsibility defenses are examples of defenses that are typically based on the defendant's actions being excusable. 7 The objective of this article is to study three interrelated issues that pertain to these broad categories of defenses. First, as a preliminary matter, I ask what social bene…ts may be served by allowing defenses? Second, given that there are some social bene…ts from allowing defenses, what kind of evidentiary standards must be used in order to balance these bene…ts against potential social costs, and how do these standards compare to the analogous standards that must be used in issues pertaining to whether the defendant committed the act? In other words, how do the optimal standards of proof in determining whether the defendant committed an o¤ense, and whether he has a valid defense, compare? Third, what reason is there to have structured a¢ rmative defenses which require the presence of various elements, instead of having very broadly de…ned defenses? Is there not a good reason, for instance, to replace all defenses that the analysis pertains to, with one a¢ rmative defense which states that the defendant ought to be acquitted whenever he has an excuse or justi…cation, or alternatively, whenever doing so would be socially desirable?
To study the …rst question, I consider a model where courts can observe, without error, whether a person has committed an o¤ense, and, whether he satis…es the requirements of a defense. In a simple Beckerian setting, where the monetary sanction is set optimally, there are no social gains generated by most defenses: if a person is deterred in the Beckerian setting, his o¤ense causes harms that o¤-set his private bene…ts, and hence, there is typically no reason to change the person's behavior; or the optimal sanction fails to deter the person, 6 In fact, this deterrence based explanation appears to be the primary rationale o¤ered -at least a century ago-by some scholars for excuses, such as duress. See, e.g., Hitchler (1917) .
One can of course envision a person taking precautions to reduce the likelihood with which he will be involuntarily intoxicated or placed under duress. Similarly, one can envision the law having an e¤ect on the behavior of even minors or people who have mental disabilities. However, the law generally de…nes these categories of defenses to be available only to a subgroup of individuals who are involuntarily intoxicated, placed under duress, are infants, or have mental disabilities. More importantly, the law places these limitations in a way that the defense is available only to the individuals who are likely to be the least responsive to incentives. 7 Naturally, the line between justi…cations and excuses can become blurry in many cases. For example, it can be unclear whether a store clerk who is forced to hand over the cash in the store's registry at gun point is justi…ed or excused, since, presumably she is unresponsive to legal incentives at gunpoint and her act enhances welfare. which implies that the existence of a defense would not change his behavior. Thus, a rationale for defenses in the Beckerian setting is limited to exceptional cases where the commission of the act generates positive externalities to third parties other than the party being harmed as a result of the o¤ense (e.g. defense of others). Hence, for most cases in which the actor has a justi…cation or an excuse, there is no need for a defense, even when courts have perfect information and, therefore, can implement defenses without generating error costs. However, when punishment is non-transferable (e.g. imprisonment), then, under perfect information, there are always bene…ts to refraining from punishing individuals who are either unresponsive (because by de…nition their behavior cannot be changed by the presence or absence of punishment, hence, punishment is wasteful), or whose acts lead to bene…ts greater than social harms (because we want them to commit these acts, and thus, punishment generates costs, without any bene…ts). To formalize this idea, the model considers non-monetary punishment. However, it should be noted that similar conclusions can be reached by considering indirect costs, such as increases in e¤orts by o¤enders to avoid punishment. 8 The perfect information case highlights potential gains from allowing defenses, in the form of a reduction in the harms in ‡icted through punishment. However, when there is imperfect information, the availability of defenses leads to wrongful acquittals, and, thereby leads to losses in deterrence, which translates into increased criminal harm. This is certainly a valid concern, but, similar deterrence costs are also implicated by the presence of errors in the determination of whether the person actually committed the o¤ense. Thus, optimal burdens and standards of proof, whether for establishing a¢ rmative defenses or o¤enses, trade-o¤ harms from punishment versus losses in deterrence. Two key insights that pertain to this trade-o¤ allow a comparison between the optimal burdens of proof for a¢ rmative defenses versus o¤enses, and thereby address the second question studied.
The …rst insight is that a court that incorrectly …nds that the defendant committed the o¤ense incentivizes people -who do not face circumstances that would justify or excuse the commission of the act-to commit the o¤ense by reducing the opportunity cost of committing the o¤ense. 9 The same is not true for denying the defense to a person who commits the o¤ense under justi…able or excusable circumstances, because the person in such circumstances is either unresponsive to incentives (e.g. when he is involuntarily intoxicated), already has the incentives to commit the act (e.g. in the case of self-defense, or in a case where the necessity defense would be applicable and the law is enforced via optimal sanctions), or it would be bene…cial to incentivize him to commit the act (e.g. in the case of defense of others, where the internalized part of the justi…ed act does not o¤-set the expected cost of conviction, and, thus, the person who would be entitled to an a¢ rmative defense is over-deterred). The second insight is that, for typical crimes, the population which does not commit the o¤ense is much larger than the population of individuals who commit the act under justi…able circumstances. Thus, an increase in the frequency of wrongfully convicting people in the former category causes a much larger increase in the population of convicts than a comparable increase in the rate at which people in the latter category are punished. These two reasons, combined, reveal a strong rationale for having a stricter standard for o¤enses than for defenses, and thereby explain why it is optimal to allocate the burden of proof on the prosecution for matters that pertain to o¤enses. The same observations also explain that it may be socially desirable to allocate the burden of proof on the defendant for many a¢ rmative defenses where (i) the defense is based on the actor having a justi…cation or excuse, and (ii) the o¤ense rate is small. However, the optimality of assigning the burden onto the defendant depends on speci…c conditions that pertain to the gains from deterrence versus costs of punishment, on the margin. The comparison between these gains and costs depends on the characteristics of the population in question, as well as punishment costs, and, thus, the optimal burden allocation may di¤er from one society to another.
These observations are useful in answering the third question: why have structured a¢ rmative defenses at all? A more speci…c question allows us to consider this issue more discretely: why not allow a defense for a person who merely asserts that he had such large bene…ts from committing the crime that he would have been undeterred even if a defense was not available? Punishing such an individual is socially wasteful, and, therefore, in the perfect information case, it would be optimal to refrain from punishing him. 10 Thus, the answer to this question relies on the court's ability to distinguish between people who have valid justi…cations and excuses and those who do not. Structured a¢ rmative defenses typically require proof of some concrete element which is, statistically, a good proxy for the person's likelihood of being unresponsiveness to enforcement schemes (e.g. that the person was su¤ering from a speci…c mental defect). The existence of these elements make the evidence generating process pertaining to the a¢ rmative defense informative. This means that there are pieces of evidence which only people with actual defenses can provide with a high likelihood (e.g. a doctor's report pertaining to the mental defect of the defendant). Claims that refer to the unobservable bene…t that one derived by committing a crime do not satisfy this property. Hence, many claims pertaining to the undeterrability of a particular defendant will not be associated with evidence generating processes that are very informative. Therefore, even when such defenses are allowed, it would be very di¢ cult for a particular defendant to provide evidence su¢ cient to meet the optimal standard of proof. This observation suggests that it may not be welfare enhancing to allow defendants to raise such defenses, given the costs a court would need to incur to simply entertain such claims. Therefore, one may conceive of structured defenses as a way of economizing on litigation costs by directing defendants towards only producing evidence which is informative.
I formalize these points in sections 2 -4. In sections 2 and 3, I construct a law enforcement model wherein defenses are possible under perfect, and imperfect information, respectively. In section 4, I analyze how the nature of the evidence pertaining to the a¢ rmative defense a¤ects the social value of allowing the defense. Section 5 suggests avenues for future research and concludes. Appendixes in the end contain various proofs, derivations, and supplementary analyses. Thus, the government has the option of making a justi…cation defense available to individuals within this group who commit the harmful act. To ease notation, it is assumed that v is constant. The distribution of bene…ts from crime are captured by the CDF N , with n = N 0 and both of these functions have support [b; 1) where b > h v. The third group, of size ' E , consists of individuals who are unresponsive to enforcement policies, either because they face extreme costs associated with not committing the crime (e.g. in the case of duress), or, they are simply unable to weigh costs and bene…ts. Thus, the government has the option of making a excuse defense available to individuals within this group who commit the harmful act. The average social bene…t generated through the commission of the o¤ense by individuals in this group is denoted b b.
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The government can perfectly observe individuals'groups, but not their bene…ts. To deter crimes, the government punishes individuals who have committed them, unless they have a valid defense. To focus the analysis on the optimality 1 1 The case where v > 0 captures defenses of others and some necessity defenses. v = 0 captures self-defense cases as well necessity defenses where the entirety of the harm to be prevented by the commission of the act are targeted towards the actor.
1 2 A defense is not allowed for people in the …rst group who have bene…ts which exceed the sanction, because the government is unable to observe individuals' bene…ts. A rationale for this approach, is provided in section 4. of defenses, the severity of the punishment is assumed to be exogenously given, and the punishment cost incurred by a convict is normalized to 1. In addition to the cost to the convict, punishment results in social costs of ( 1) (e.g. due to costs of administration, maintenance, etc), such that the total cost of punishment is per-convict. For similar expositional reasons, the probability of auditing people's behavior is also normalized to 1. It is assumed that b > 1 such that there is under-deterrence among the …rst group. A brief analysis in Appendix A shows that the standard Beckerian result holds when the audit probability and the punishment are determined by the government: it is optimal to impose the maximal sanction along with a low probability of audit which leads to under-deterrence. Thus, the inclusion of these variables as endogenous choices for the government does change any of the results that are derived based on the assumptions listed above.
In this section, the only choices of the government are whether or not to allow defenses based on justi…cations and excuses. Thus, welfare, can be expressed as
where Proof. First, note that f W ( J ; 0) f W ( J ; 1) = ' E , thus, an excuse based defense enhances welfare if, and only if, > 0. Second, note that
, which implies that a justi…cation based defense enhances welfare if, and only if, > 0. On the other hand, when b < 1,
which implies that justi…cation based defenses enhance welfare whenever b < 1.
The proof of proposition 1 simply demonstrates that compared to a regime where there is no defense, setting E = 0 enhances welfare by reducing the cost of imprisonment (by an amount equal to ' E ). The e¤ect of a justi…ca-tion depends on whether sanctions have a deterrent e¤ect on some people with justi…cations. When 1 b, sanctions have no deterrence e¤ect, and, thus, the only impact of a defense is to enhance welfare by eliminating punishment costs, which equal ' J . On the other hand, when 1 > b, a justi…cation defense causes an increase in the measure of justi…ed o¤enses committed, from N (1) to ' J . Thus, allowing the justi…cation defense causes a reduction of [' J N (1)] in imprisonment costs, while increasing social welfare due to justi…ed o¤enses committed by
It is worth noting that this latter social bene…t is present only when some individuals with justi…cations do not have personal bene…ts that o¤-set the harm from crime, but, whose acts are nevertheless justi…able because they confer bene…ts to third parties such that v > h b. This may happen, for instance, in cases involving defense of others. The analysis also reveals that in simple models where the punishment is monetary, there is value to allowing a¢ rmative defenses only in these latter cases, since = 0 implies no bene…ts in situations where 1 b.
A¢ rmative Defenses with Imperfect Information
I now consider the case where courts make errors both in determining whether the defendant committed the act, and in determining whether the person is entitled to a defense. These errors occur, because courts do not possess perfect information, and must rely on noisy signals to make decisions about defendants. In particular, courts may commit type-1 and type-2 errors. In o¤ense related determinations, type-1 errors refer to incorrectly …nding that the defendant committed the o¤ense, whereas in defense related determinations they correspond to incorrectly …nding that the defendant is not entitled to a defense. Type-2 errors correspond to the opposite mistakes. When these judicial errors are possible, the defendant is no longer certain that he will be convicted or acquitted. Thus, when he is required to submit evidence pertinent to his case, he may have to make a strategic decision, and choose to submit the type of evidence that increases his odds of acquittal. In reality, the types of evidence that increase the odds of raising a successful a¢ rmative defense often require the person to admit that he has committed the o¤ense. In fact, this is often embedded in the nature of the a¢ rmative defense: in the quintessential necessity hypothetical studied by lawyers, the defendant asserts that he broke into a cabin to avoid freezing to death in a blizzard. This requires disclosing that he, in fact, broke in to the cabin. To capture this trade-o¤, I assume that people who commit the o¤ense have the option of disclosing infor-mation that is conclusive of the fact that they committed the act, but which generates a noisy signal about whether they committed the act under justi…able or excusable circumstance. This corresponds to assuming that the defendant bears what is called the burden of production, and that only people who have committed the o¤ense can meet this burden. A procedural cost minimization rationale for this assumption is provided in Hay and Spier (1997) . Moreover, the assumption is consistent with the evidentiary processes of many courts, and also simpli…es the derivation of probabilities of conviction.
This framework guarantees that people who have not committed the o¤ense focus on proving this fact. The choice for a guilty person, i.e. a person who has committed the o¤ense without a justi…cation or excuse, however, is not as clear. Presumably, the person's choice will depend on his belief about which issue the prosecutor has stronger inculpatory evidence on. To formalize this idea, I assume that guilty defendants are of di¤erent types, denoted as a t 2 [0; 1), which are revealed to them as private knowledge after they commit the o¤ense. The defendant's type is indicative of the relative strength of his a¢ rmative defense case compared to his case with respect to whether he committed the o¤ense. 13 A large t implies a weak case with respect defenses. As explained in Appendix B, this assumption, coupled with standard monotone likelihood ratio properties (MLRP) regarding noisy signals emitted by defendants imply that the probabilities of conviction for a type t defendant, conditional on not raising an a¢ rmative defense, and raising an a¢ rmative defense, respectively, can be expressed as:
Here, o 2 [0; 1] denotes the probability of conviction for a person who has not committed the o¤ense. Similarly, d 2 [0; 1] is the probability with which a person who has a justi…cation or an excuse is convicted after raising an a¢ rmative defense. Therefore, i2fo;dg represent type-1 errors that the court may commit when assessing whether a person has committed the o¤ense, and when assessing whether the person has a valid defense, respectively. As is noted in the prior literature, 14 there is an equivalence between courts choosing a threshold evidentiary standard, and …xing the type-1 error at a particular level. Thus, to simplify the exposition, here, I take the government's choice variables as o and d , and relegate the formal derivation of these probabilities from evidence generation processes to Appendix B. This simpli…ed notation allows the expression of probabilities of conviction for guilty individuals as functions of the government's choice of type-1 errors and their types, as in (5) .
Some properties of i2fo;dg are worth highlighting, as they play an important role in derivations that follow. In particular,
Moreover, MLRP implies that
That a high t indicates a weaker defense case is re ‡ected by
Moreover, to guarantee that there are always some guilty defendants who choose to raise a defense and some who choose to not, I assume that
This last property ensures that no attention is diverted towards trivial and suboptimal cases where one of the options is never exercised by guilty individuals.
Assuming that types are continuously distributed, such cases obviously cannot be optimal, because the government could increase welfare by slightly reducing the type-1 error over the dimension which is never chosen by guilty individuals, and, hence increase welfare by reducing the number of wrongful convictions. Thus, the only function of (8) is to simplify the analysis. Finally, it is worth highlighting a possibility which I have not yet considered. People who have justi…cations and excuses may, counterintuitively, …nd it preferable to not raise a defense, if the standard used in the determination of o¤enses provide signi…cantly greater protections to defendants than those used in the determination of defenses. A simple observation reveals that type-1 errors that generate this result can never be optimal: since guilty individuals face a higher probability of conviction upon raising an a¢ rmative defense than defendants who truly have a¢ rmative defense, a choice of o and d that induces people with justi…cations or excuses to refrain from raising a¢ rmative defenses will also induce guilty individuals to refrain from raising a¢ rmative defenses. Thus, the government can improve upon a system that causes this result by reducing d until only people with actual justi…cations and excuses choose to raise a¢ rmative defenses. This policy change increases welfare by reducing punishment costs, while leaving the incentives of people who are responsive to policies, unchanged. Thus, in the remaining analysis, I focus only on cases where
, and formalize, in note 18 below, the suboptimality of cases where
. Given the properties and assumptions listed above, the timeline of events can be summarized as follows.
Individuals'Decision Making Processes and Behavior
Individuals' behavior can be analyzed via backward induction. In the second period, a person with a justi…cation chooses to raise an a¢ rmative defense, since
Whenever this condition holds, it follows, via (8) , that there exists a critical type, t(
such that guilty defendants choose to raise an a¢ rmative defense if, and only if, t t. Thus, in period 1, a person who has no justi…cation or excuse, faces a probability of conviction of
where the arguments of t and i2fo;dg are omitted to simplify notation, and P and E denote the likelihood of an event and the expectation operator, respectively. Therefore, a person who has no justi…cation or excuse expects a net bene…t of b from committing crime. The same individuals face a conviction probability of o if they choose not to commit crime. Therefore, a person who has no justi…cation or excuse commits crime if
On the other hand, a person who has a justi…cation or excuse, commits the act if
It is possible for some people with justi…cations to be deterred from committing crime, if 1 > b, since the strongest standard for o¤enses (i.e. o = 0) combined with the weakest standard for defenses (i.e. d = 1) maximizes deterrence for these individuals and causes them to refrain from committing the act if they have bene…ts smaller than the sanction. This case represents situations where the justi…cation would not exist but for the presence of positive externalities conferred on to third parties through the actions of the actor, and is analyzed in Appendix C. The analysis of this case requires additional notation, and does not reveal results that signi…cantly di¤er from the case where 1 < b. Thus, to explain the main results in a compact manner the analysis in section 3.3. focuses on cases where justi…ed acts generate bene…ts to the actor that exceed the sanction (i.e. b > 1).
Ranking Standards of Proof
Before analyzing the optimality of various standards of proof, a couple of observations can be made to compare the strength of various standards that correspond to the type-1 errors that the government may choose to use. The terms that play a key role in making such comparisons are
These terms refer to the impact that the standards of proof over dimensions o and d have on the ex-ante probability of convicting a person who, in reality, has committed the act without a justi…cation or excuse. In particular, a change in the standard that causes a one unit change in the probability of type-1 error over dimension i has the e¤ect of increasing the ex-ante probability of convicting a guilty person by @ @ i . This can be true, only if the threshold signal used by the court in determining verdicts is one which is @ @ i times likely to be produced by a guilty individual rather than one who is not guilty. In more familiar jargon, @ @ i corresponds to the likelihood ratio pertaining to the evidence generating process. Thus, a large @ @ i corresponds to a strong standard of proof, since it leads to convictions only if the signal is more frequently produced by guilty individuals than individuals who are not guilty due to the presence of the exculpating factor in question (i.e. non-commission of the o¤ense if i = o, and a justi…cation or excuse if i = d). The special case where the standard of proof is such that @ @ i = 1 has a very intuitive meaning: it represents that standard which convicts an individual, if, and only if, the signal emitted by that person is more frequently emitted by a guilty individual rather than an individual who possesses the exculpating factor being investigated. Due to this reason, this standard is called preponderance of the evidence, as discussed in Demougin and Fluet (2006) . This standard is very useful in discussing the relationship between various standards and burdens of proof. However, de…ning some terms is useful to eliminate potential ambiguities.
De…nition 1 (i) The 'likelihood ratio of a signal' refers to the frequency with which the signal is produced by a guilty individual divided by the frequency with which the signal is produced by a person who possesses the exculpating factor in question. (ii) A standard of proof is a threshold value s 2 [0; 1), such that the court convicts the defendant whenever the likelihood ratio of the signal emitted by the defendant exceeds this threshold value. (iii) Standard s 0 is stronger than standard s 00 , if s 0 > s 00 . (iv) s = 1 is the preponderance of the evidence standard. (v) A standard allocates the burden of proof on the defendant if s < 1, and it allocates the burden of proof on the prosecution if s > 1.
De…nition 1 makes references to signals and likelihood ratios, which are formally considered only in Appendix B. Lemma 1, below, establishes the relationships between these concepts and @ @ i , whose intuitive meaning is discussed above. This structure attempts to expedite the derivation of main results and keep the analysis focused. The reader who is interested in signal generating processes may consult Appendix B before moving forward. Proof. See Appendix B Lemma 1 reveals how one can rank and compare standards of proof only by focusing on how standards chosen by the government impact type-1 errors relative to type-2 errors. Before, proceeding, it may be useful to acknowledge that, de…nition 1 and lemma 1, above, refer to the burden of proof and the strength of standards in a di¤erent way than some of the usages encountered in the existing literature.
The function of the burden of proof, here, is to identify the party whom the noisy signal must favor for it to win. The signal favors the defendant, if it is more frequently produced by a person who possesses the exculpatory factor the defendant is claiming to possess than a guilty person. The signal favors the prosecution, if it is more frequently produced by a guilty person than a person who possesses the exculpatory factor the defendant is claiming to possess. This use of the phrase coincides, to a large extent, with what is often called the burden of persuasion in the law, 17 because in most cases where the defendant bears the burden of persuasion, he has to produce evidence that is more consistent with his claim than the alternative.
The usage of the word strength is not completely aligned with the way one thinks of the strength associated with a standard in real legal disputes. The misalignment arises (only) in cases where the burden of proof is on the defendant. This can be illustrated by noting that requiring the defendant to prove his case with clear and convincing evidence is thought to correspond to a 'stronger' standard of proof than preponderance of the evidence, since more is demanded from the defendant. However, de…nition 1 would rank the former standard as being weaker than the latter, because it ranks standards based on how much protection they a¤ord to the defendant, and calls standards that a¤ord greater protections, 'stronger'. This de…nition has the advantage of having a monotonic relationship with likelihood ratios, and thus, allows more compact descriptions of results.
Next, optimal burdens of proof are characterized by using the rankings identi…ed in this section.
Optimal Burdens of Proof
In identifying the optimal burdens and standards of proof, the analysis focuses on the case where people with justi…cations are never deterred (i.e. b > 1). (The alternative case, whose analysis reveals similar results, is analyzed in Appendix C.) This condition is met, for instance, when the justi…cations in question are based on acts which confer bene…ts to the actor which are greater than the harms from the o¤ense (i.e. b > h). In these cases, to simplify notation, we may denote the measure of individuals with justi…cations or excuses, as ' and express the total net-bene…t caused by the acts of individuals with the symbol . Thus, welfare, which equals the expected sum of net-bene…ts, can be expressed as:
where the arguments of b and are omitted, and derivations below contain similar omissions to abbreviate expressions. 
It follows that the optimal o and d are interior, assuming that the optimal solution involves some deterrence. 19 Thus, the optimal standards of proof are characterized by the following …rst order conditions:
; and (17)
An inspection of (17) and (18) reveals the following.
Proposition 2 (i) It is optimal to place the burden on the prosecution to prove that the defendant committed the o¤ ense.
(ii) It is optimal to employ a stronger 1 8 To see that cases where d o ( o ) are suboptimal, note that in such cases welfare is una¤ected by d and equals:
which follows from (27). 1 9 That some degree of deterrence is desirable implies that the optimal d and o are positive.
Note 18, above implies that the optimal d is smaller than 1, and (15) implies that
Thus, the optimal solutions are interior.
standard for proving that the defendant committed the o¤ ense than the standard used for determining whether the defendant has a valid defense, if the number of people who do not commit the act is greater than the number of people who have valid defenses or if the marginal deterrence bene…ts are su¢ ciently large
It is optimal to place the burden on the defendant to prove that he has a valid defense if, and only if,
Proof. (17) and (18) imply that
, in which case, it follows via lemma 1 that there is a stronger standard for proving that the defendant committed the o¤ense than the standard used for determining whether the defendant has a valid defense. (iii) It follows via (18) that
, in which case, it follows, via lemma 1, that the burden of proof is on the defendant.
Proposition 1 summarizes the main result; the asymmetry in the way burdens of proof are allocated across issues pertaining to defenses versus o¤enses can be rationalized by focusing on the incentive e¤ects and the statistical rareness of circumstances giving rise to valid a¢ rmative defenses. The di¤erence in incentive e¤ects can be observed by noting that the marginal deterrence gains associated with an increase in o are proportional to
1 whereas an increase in d causes similar gains that are proportional to @ @ d . This is due to the asymmetry in deterrence e¤ects previously explained. Similarly, the marginal increase in the imprisonment cost caused by an increase in o is greater than the analogous increase caused by a similar increase in d , as long as the number of people who elect not to commit the o¤ense is greater than the number of people who have justi…cations and excuses. The …nal result, highlighted in proposition 1 suggests that whether the defense or prosecution ought to bear the burden in proving the presence or absence of a defense depends on the number of people who are on the margin, i.e. indi¤erent between committing crime and not committing crime, the harm from crime, the cost of imprisonment, and the number of people who are, in actuality, not guilty, either because they have a justi…cation or have not committed the crime.
Overall, the results are, in a certain way, consistent with what we observe across jurisdictions in the United States: there is uniformity across jurisdictions in allocating the burden of proof to the prosecution in proving that the defendant committed the act. The model suggests that this is an optimal practice. There is, however, variation across jurisdictions, in terms of who carries the burden of proof when an a¢ rmative defense is raised. The model suggests that either allocation of the burden of proof can be optimal, depending on the relationship between deterrence bene…ts, and punishment costs avoidable, on the margin.
Informativeness and the Social Value of A¢ rmative Defenses
The preceding analysis demonstrates that a¢ rmative defenses enhance welfare, even when courts have imperfect information. Moreover, this result is derived in a fairly general framework, and, thus, it may lead one to believe that allowing all types of defenses, even one which simply relies on the defendant's bene…t from crime being large, may enhance welfare. In this section, I demonstrate that the value from allowing the defendant to raise an a¢ rmative defense is limited by the informativeness of the type of evidence which gives rise to the defense. In particular, as the evidence generating process associated with the defense gets less informative, the potential welfare gains from allowing the defense are diminished. This suggests that it is ine¢ cient to allow the defense, when there are costs associated with reviewing the defendant's claims.
To formalize the informativeness of the evidence generating process, note that the di¤erence between d (t; d ) and d can be thought of as a measure of the extent to which a court can distinguish between a type t o¤ender and a person who has a valid defense by using an evidentiary standard that generates these probabilities of conviction. For similar reasons,
can be thought of as a measure of the potential of a standard of proof to discriminate between guilty defendants and defendants who have valid defenses. Thus, if we denote by k(t; I) the probability density function over types, where I 2 (0; 1) measures the informativeness of the evidence generating process, we can express (19) as:
Intuitively, as k assigns greater densities to types whose guilt can more easily be ascertained, it causes the court to better distinguish between people with valid defenses, and defendants who raise false defenses. This becomes obvious when one imagines the extreme case (which is ruled out by the assumption that t 2 [0; 1)) where all guilty people are type t = 1, such that they are convicted with certainty when they raise an a¢ rmative defense. The opposite extreme (which, again, is ruled out by the assumption that k(t; I) > 0 for all t 2 [0; 1)) corresponds to a case where the evidence generating process is completely uninformative; all guilty people are type t = 0, such that they all have the same probability of being convicted as people with valid justi…cations. This corresponds to the case where the court is unable to distinguish between people with valid defenses and guilty people, to any degree. Cases in between are more or less informative according to the weight that k places on high types and low types. These observations can be operationalized by assuming that I is a shift parameter, such that Intuitively, as the evidence generating process gets less informative, the only way the court can better distinguish between a large proportion of defendants who dishonestly raise an a¢ rmative defense and who truthfully raise an af…rmative defense is to use a lower standard of proof, i.e. increase the type-1 error d . This is because, given a …xed level of o , the e¤ect of a reduction in the informativeness of the evidence process is to increase the measure of defendants who dishonestly raise a¢ rmative defenses. Thus, the court can counteract this e¤ect by reducing the protections available to defendants, and thus, deter people without valid justi…cations or excuses from raising a¢ rmative defenses. In the limiting case where the evidence generation process approaches being completely uninformative, i.e. I ! 0, the only way to separate people with valid a¢ rmative defenses from those who do not, is to allow the type-1 error to converge to o ( o ), since only people with valid defenses are willing to raise them when
The implications of this observation vis-à-vis the social value of a¢ rmative defenses becomes apparent by noting that, then, social welfare converges to
which is the same level of welfare obtained without the use of a¢ rmative defenses. Thus, we have the following result.
Proposition 3
As the evidence generating process associated with the a¢ rmative defense approaches being completely uninformative, the social value from allowing the a¢ rmative defense approaches zero.
Proof. See Appendix B.
The formal proof for this proposition is relegated to the appendix, as it involves the use of additional notation, and follows steps that are very similar to those outlined in the text preceding the proposition. An important corollary of this observation, which follows from a simple continuity argument, is the following.
Corollary 1 If allowing defendants to introduce a¢ rmative defenses generates administrative costs, then there exists su¢ ciently uninformative evidence generating processes which make it ine¢ cient to allow a¢ rmative defenses.
Corollary 1 illustrates the idea that a¢ rmative defenses which rest on highly speculative claims and must rely on uninformative evidence generating processes are likely to bring about social bene…ts that are outweighed by the administrative costs of allowing such defenses. This observation provides a rationale as to why many defenses contain elements that pertain to events that can be reliably and objectively veri…ed and lead to a certain degree of discrimination between honest and deceptive defendants.
Conclusion
There is uniformity in the burden of proof that is applicable in a criminal trial when the issue pertains to whether the defendant committed the o¤ense. This is contrasted by great variation across jurisdictions as to who carries the burden of proof, and what the applicable standard is, when the issue pertains to defenses. The contrast between the uniformity in one dimension and the variation in the other dimension may appear troubling or surprising. However, an analysis of the di¤erences between the two contexts reveals quite simple rationales for this contrast. Errors in the determination of whether a person committed an o¤ense, and errors in the determination of whether the person has a valid justi…cation or excuse have di¤erent consequences. In particular, incorrectly denying defenses reduce welfare less than similar errors committed in the determination of o¤enses: they lead to smaller reductions in deterrence, and they increase punishment costs to a lesser degree. Although the dynamics that lead to these observations imply that the prosecution ought to bear the burden of proof in o¤ense related issues, they do not necessarily imply that it is optimal to assign the burden of proving the existence of valid defenses to the defendant. The optimality of such allocations depend on conditions that pertain to the gains from deterrence versus costs of punishment, on the margin.
These insights can be used to study related issues in future research. One may, for instance, attempt to measure the ratios between marginal gains from deterrence and marginal punishment costs across di¤erent jurisdictions, and question whether variations in these ratios may explain variations in the way jurisdictions assign burdens of proof for a¢ rmative defenses. Moreover, insights provided in the analysis can be used to study the optimality of partial defenses which were not analyzed in this article. For instance, a defendant in a homicide case who successfully proves the existence of adequate provocation and/or extreme emotional distress is generally punished for a lesser o¤ense than a defendant who has no similar defense. One may investigate whether there exists a deterrence or punishment cost based rationale for the existence of such defenses, and, if so, what the optimal standard of proof should be in demonstrating the validity or invalidity of such partial defenses.
Appendix A: Endogenous Sanctions and Detection Probabilities
When the government can choose the punishment which may not exceed a maximum sentence of z, and when it can set the audit probability p by incurring a cost of c(p) (with c 0 > 0 > c 00 ) it follows that welfare is given by
where refers to the defense policy adopted by the government described in section 2, and
It follows from (21) that whenever z = z l < z, and p = p h , welfare can be increased by increasing z l to some z h 2 (z l ; z], while simultaneously decreasing
. This is because such changes lead to no change in deterrence or punishment costs, while reducing the cost of audit, c(p). Thus, given that defenses and the punishment are chosen optimally, it follows that the impact of a change in the probability of audit on welfare is given by . The …rst signal is used as evidence in determining whether the person committed the act, is produced by all individuals, and is always observed by the court. The second signal is produced only by people who committed the act, and is observed by the court only if the defendant raises an a¢ rmative defense. Thus, the observation of any y by the court is conclusive evidence that the person committed the act.
A person who has not committed the o¤ense emits signal x with probability f (xjn) where n stands for not committed, whereas a person who has committed the act emits the same signal with probability f (xja) where a stands for act committed. Here, the functions f (xji 2 fa; ng) are probability density functions with support [0; 1]. Similarly, a person who has a valid justi…cation or excuse, produces a signal y with probability g(yjj) where j stands for justi…cation or excuse and a person who does not have a valid justi…cation or excuse produces signal y with probability g(yjt) where t 2 [0; 1) is the guilty defendant's type revealed to him after he commits the act. The signal y is observed by the court only if the defendant raises an a¢ rmative defense. g(xji 2 j [ [0; 1)) are also probability density functions with support [0; 1]. Types are distributed with the probability density function k(t). The monotone likelihood ratio (MLRP) holds, such that
g(yjj) ) @y < 0 for all t 2 [0; 1)]. This means that small values of x are more consistent with the person having committed the act than large values of x. Similarly, small values of y are more consistent with the person having a justi…cation or excuse than large values of y. Standards of proof correspond to threshold signal values, denoted x and y, such that the court produces a verdict that favors the defendant when x < x and when y < y.
Denoting the cumulative distribution functions associated with f and g as F and G, it follows that type-1 errors generated by the standards chosen by the government are o (x) = F (xjn); and (23) d (y) = G(yjj) since both functions are increasing in the standard, it follows that x and y can be expressed as functions of targeted levels of type-1 error, as follows:
where
denote the inverses of the functions F (xjn) and G(yjj).
Using this notation, one can express the probability of correct verdicts as follows:
Assuming that x and y are chosen such that o ( o ) d , it follows that the ex-ante probability of being convicted, conditional on committing an o¤ense without a justi…cation, is:
where t is de…ned in (10) . Proof of Lemma 1 Di¤erentiating with respect to d and o reveals that
; and (27)
Thus, @ @ o and @ @ d correspond to the standards de…ned in de…nition 1, since, due to MLRP,
This implies that 
which holds, since, b o < o . Thus, as I ! 0, there are no gains from allowing an a¢ rmative defense which induces a type-1 error of
. Moreover, by assumption, some degree of deterrence is desirable, and, thus, cannot generate any welfare beyond the optimal regime which involves some deterrence. Finally, welfare generated in a regime where
equals welfare generated in a regime where no a¢ rmative defenses are allowed, and, thus, the maximum welfare obtainable in a regime with a¢ rmative defenses converges to the welfare obtainable in a regime without defenses.
Appendix C: Justi…cations Based on Positive Externalities
The previous section supposes that people who have justi…cations always commit the act, regardless of the speci…c policies that pertain to the existence of defenses. However, if the act is justi…ed because the person commits an act that is meant to protect others from harm, or to provide others certain bene…ts, then the fact the act is justi…ed does not necessarily imply that the person will commit the act. In particular, it could be the case that b < 1 < h < b + v; which implies that the person's private bene…t may be smaller than the maximum expected sanction (which equals 1), and yet, the act is justi…ed because its commission provides a large bene…t of v to third parties. In these circumstances, as previously noted in (13), people will be deterred from committing the act if b d o < b. Note that it is possible for b to be negative in the unrealistic case where the probability of being wrongful punished for an act one has not committed ( o ) and the probability of successfully raising an a¢ rmative defense (1 d ) are both very high. In these cases, people who actually perceive costs associated with committing the act may end up committing it. Situations giving rise to these possibilities may not be optimal. Nevertheless, these possibilities cannot immediately be ruled out, and, therefore, to eliminate potential discontinuities in the welfare function, I now assume that b < 1.
With these modi…cations, social welfare can be expressed as
(29) which re ‡ects the fact that errors in the determination of valid justi…cations may have an undesirable deterrence e¤ect.
Di¤erentiating W with respect to o and d reveals that
where o and d are the marginal deterrence e¤ects de…ned as follows: Thus, the optimal solutions can be characterized as follows:
; and (33)
Inspecting (33) and (34) reveals that variants of the results reported in proposition 1 emerge when policies deter the commission of some justi…able acts. The only di¤erence between (17)- (18) and (33)- (34) 33) and (34) . The over-all impact of these e¤ects on the optimal standards of naturally depends on whether there are bene…ts or costs associated with the deterrence of these individuals, and, if there are costs associated with deterrence, whether they are greater than the imprisonment costs associated with the deterrence of these individuals. Therefore, it is impossible to make unambiguous statements about how the optimal standard for defenses changes when it is possible for some justi…able acts to be deterred as a result of changes in policies. However, it is possible to identify a few intuitive conditions under which, d > N (b ), and thus, the deterrability of justi…able acts causes the optimal standard of proof in establishing defenses to be stronger. In particular, this condition can be re-written as:
Thus, when the gap between the bene…t to others and the harm from crime (i.e. v h) is large, and when marginal people with justi…cations are highly responsive to expected sanctions (i.e.
n(b )
N (b ) is large), the deterrability of justi…ed acts causes the optimal standard to be stronger.
